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Recent discussions of climate change in multiple domains—the academic literature, the popular 
press, political movements, and international climate policy regime—have increasingly framed 
the phenomenon as a “crisis,” an “emergency,” or an “urgent” situation. In this paper, we 
contextualize the time pressure of climate change in the broader social science literature, 
perform bibliometric and discourse analyses of this framing, and explore potential implications 
of this trend for climate decision making. 
 
While the increased prevalence of time pressure terms is arguably part and parcel of modernity, 
these terms are in general not synonymous. In the context of climate decision making, we find 
that “urgency” functions as a boundary object relaying the internalization of time pressure 
between (1) the academic literature and the international climate change policy regime and (2) 
political movements and the popular press; especially as construed in these latter domains, 
“crisis” and “emergency” connote time pressure but so too generate a constellation of other 
affective and cognitive states. A review of a set of related literatures suggests that the time 
pressure framing of climate change affects the quantity and quality of information and the range 
of options (e.g., geoengineering) considered in choice processes for mitigation and adaptation 
actions, as well as the sequencing and timing of chosen plan elements; furthermore, these effects 
likely vary in both direction and magnitude with characteristics of the individuals or 
organizations in which they manifest. Taken as a whole, the crisis framing of climate change is 
likely to polarize beliefs and actions, especially in the absence of accompanying information 




Everywhere our world is in “crisis,”4 a word imbued with an urgency that—like “emergency”—
seems uniquely well suited to the temporality of modern life.5 6 7 8 For some, the ubiquity of 
crisis has meant its de facto normalization;9 for others, crisis discourse reflects the active 
                                               
4 Koselleck, R. (1988). Critique and crisis: Enlightenment and the pathogenesis of modern society. MIT Press. 
5 Arendt, H. (2006 [1960]). The crisis in culture: Its social and its political significance. In Between Past and Future. 
London: Penguin Books. pp. 194–222. 
6 Starn, R. (1971). Historians and ‘crisis’. Past and Present 52(1): 3–22. 
7 Holton, R. J. (1987). The idea of crisis in modern society. British Journal of Sociology, 502-520. 
8 Roitman, J. (2013). Anti-crisis. Duke University Press. 
9 Perrow, C. (1999). Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
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construction of society as a “permanent state of exception”10 11 12 13 steeped in a calculus of 
risk.14 
 
What’s more, there are few domains more “crisis-ridden” than human–environment interaction.15 
Colin Hay writes, presciently, “‘crisis’, whether environmental or ecological, ecosystemic or 
ecoregional, is perhaps the most ubiquitous concept deployed within the burgeoning 
environmental and ecological literature.”16 Climate change, as a global collective action 
challenge with potentially tremendous material consequences, is a prototypical phenomenon that 
interlocutors might locate in this discourse.17 
 
While there is substantial debate whether the global climate system indeed exhibits a degree of 
anthropogenic interference that merits the use of various terms that refer to time pressure,18 19 20 
we remain agnostic to this point. Instead, we seek to explore the circuits of meaning organized 
around these frames and their implications for climate decision making. In section 2, we provide 
definitions, taking care to distinguish between the various time pressure terms insofar as we find 
these distinctions illuminating. In section 3, we contextualize the time pressure framing21 of 
climate change in the broader social science literature. Section 4 presents the results of a 
bibliometric and critical discourse analysis of this framing as it manifests across four domains: 
                                               
10 Schmitt, C. (1922). Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität. Duncker & Humblot. 
11 Benjamin, Walter. (1999 [1968]). Illuminations. London: Pimlico Press. 
12 Agamben, G. (1998). Sovereign power and bare life. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
13 Mbembe, A. & Corcoran, S. (2019). Necropolitics. Durham London: Duke University Press. 
14 Beck, U., Lash, S., & Wynne, B. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity. Sage. 
15 Only political economy might rival this domain for its proliferation of crisis constructions, as discussed in Jessop, 
B. (2013). Recovered imaginaries, imagined recoveries: a cultural political economy of crisis construals and crisis 
management in the North Atlantic financial crisis. In: Before and beyond the global economic crisis. Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
16 Hay, C. (1996). From crisis to catastrophe? The ecological pathologies of the liberal—democratic state form. 
Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 9(4), 421-434. 
17 See Ulrich Beck’s critical point that phenomena most deeply conducive to the “crisis theory of social–natural 
relations” are those “self-generated manufactured uncertainties … beyond the limit of insurability.” Beck, U. (1999). 
World risk society. Malden, MA: Polity Press. 
18 Risbey, J. S. (2008). The new climate discourse: Alarmist or alarming?. Global Environmental Change, 18(1), 26-
37. 
19 Ripple, W. J., Wolf, C., Newsome, T. M., Barnard, P., & Moomaw, W. R. (2019). World scientists’ warning of a 
climate emergency. BioScience. 
20 Warner, J., & Boas, I. (2017). Securitisation of climate change: the risk of exaggeration. Ambiente & Sociedade, 
20(3), 203-224. 
21 While our later discussion handles this in more detail, we clarify at the outset that we understand the time pressure 
framing of climate change to involve the direct description of climate change as “urgent,” a “crisis,” or an 
“emergency.” Such description is distinct from a discussion of climate change as, for example, a “catastrophe,” 
which emphasizes only the magnitude of its effects. It is also distinct from descriptions of the science of climate 
change or uncertainty associated with it. We believe that time pressure is one of many somewhat distinct and 
broadly salient terrains of cultural beliefs that can help individuals negotiate meaning—a “frame.” Further, this 
frame connects with the prevalence of crisis discourse in sensemaking about human–environment interaction. As 
such, we are interested in the origin and effects of the explicit framing of climate change through the lens of time 
pressure—the “time pressure framing of climate change.” 
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articles in academic journals, documents of the international climate change policy regime, 
articles in the popular press, and statements by political movements directed toward climate 
action. In section 5, we explore the potential implications for climate decision making of the 
various ways that actors in these domains construe the time pressure associated with climate 
change. A short conclusion, section 6, summarizes these sections, indicates that the effects of 
time pressure are multiple and work in a variety of ways, and calls for fuller and deeper 
exploration of these topics.  
 
 
2. Crisis, emergency, and urgency 
 
We turn first to definitions, noting that “despite, or perhaps because of, [the] pervasiveness [of 
crisis, it] remains one of the most illusive, vague, imprecise, malleable, open-ended and 
generally unspecified concepts within both the theoreticians’ and the ecologists’ armoury. 
Indeed, the more one ponders this, the more it seems likely that the term’s ubiquity derives 
precisely from its notorious imprecision.”22 Despite a multiplicity of definitions complicating 
efforts to integrate the crisis literature,23 crises appear to share at least two features: “First, there 
is a sequence of events that have created turmoil, instability and/or the conditions for upheaval 
and dramatic change. Second, this sequence leads to dramatic change.”24 As a historical object, 
crisis is a punctuation—a spasm of time that ruptures the longue durée25 and marks a suspension 
of our steady movement into the future, even as that future foists itself upon us.26 Crises carry a 
sense of singularity (else they are simply “normal accidents”27) and temporariness (else they 
become “a general problem”28). And while crises imply a turning point, they do not necessarily 
present a “way out.” Consider the two non-obsolete definitions provided by the Oxford English 
Dictionary:29 first, “the point in the progress of a disease when an important development or 
change takes place,”30 and second, a “decisive stage in the progress of anything.” Indeed, 
although the term originates with the Greek krinô (to separate, to choose, to decide, to judge), the 
                                               
22 Hay, C. (1999). Crisis and the structural transformation of the state: interrogating the process of change. The 
British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 1(3), 317–344. 
23 McKendree, A. (2011). Synthesizing and integrating the crisis literature: A reflective practice. The Review of 
Communication. 
24 Della Sala, V. (2011). Crisis, what crisis? Narration, crisis and decline in the European Union. EUSA Paper 8F. 
25 Fernand Braudel, a vocal critic of episodic history, opens his retrospective discussion of the Annales school, 
“There is a general crisis in the human sciences.” Braudel, F., & Wallerstein, I. (2009). History and the Social 
Sciences: The Longue Durée. Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 32(2), 171-203. 
26 To Antonio Gramsci, “crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born.” 
Gramsci, A. (2011). Prison Notebooks, Volume 2. Columbia University Press. 
27 Perrow, C. (1999). Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
28 Carley, K. (1991). Designing organizational structures to cope with communication break- downs: A simulation 
model. Industrial Crisis Quarterly 5: 19–57. 
29 "crisis, n." OED Online, Oxford University Press, December 2019, www.oed.com/view/Entry/44539. 
30 This being the dominant meaning of the etymological predecessors of “crisis” for over two millennia (see 
Roitman, 2013, p. 15). 
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OED labels two definitions associated with judgement and deliberation as obsolete. What is 
missing from the broadest modern definition of crisis, then, is agency: while crisis implies 
decisiveness, it may simply represent a conflict that drives a mechanical—rather than 
deliberative—response.31 
 
“Emergency” similarly folds into itself a sense of time pressure, but, as Ben Anderson writes, 
contains a more profound seed of emancipatory potential: 
 
“The sense of urgency that is part of emergency involves two interrelated temporalities … The first 
… is the time of an omnipresent Present: there is no time except the time of now that requires some 
form of urgent action … in emergency the time to act is compressed, and pauses in action supposedly 
become luxuries that threaten delay. Delay is a risk. There is no time to wait … ‘claims of 
emergency’ function through an affect of urgency that forestalls processes of deliberation and 
dissensus. Democratic procedures and habits become impediments to timely action, since ‘the 
unspoken presumption is that either one can think or one can act, and given that it is absolutely 
mandatory that an action be performed, thinking must fall away’32 … The second temporality 
connected to the sense of urgency is … the interval: the gap or break during which emergency action 
can still make a difference. If action is decisive and happens at the correct time, then the emergency 
can be brought to an end without loss, harm or damage. Like the state of exception that is the 
emergency, the interval is an interruption to linear time: it defines a space-time for action in-between 
the onset of something new and the temporary stabilization of a changed present.”33 
 
That is, while “emergency” constrains communicative rationality, it likewise implies a place for 
agency in averting some dangerous future. 
 
“Urgency,” by contrast, is metonymic: a feature of both “crisis” and “emergency,” it nonetheless 
does not necessarily import their sense of threat. The psychological literature, for instance, 
recognizes both positive and negative urgency as motivating action in response to positive and 
negative affect, respectively;34 an “urgent” situation may be more an opportunity than a cause for 
alarm. Its adoption by psychology speaks to another important semantic distinction between 
“urgency” and “crisis”/“emergency”: while the latter terms describe perceived states of the 
world, the former is very often proprioceptive—as in a “sense of urgency.” Put differently, 
urgency—related to the notion of an “urge”—is largely an intrinsic or internal phenomenon, 
whereas “crisis” and “emergency” are extrinsic or external phenomena that can, under some 
conditions, elicit internal responses. 
 
                                               
31 This following the typology set forth in Jones, E. (2006). ‘They have no idea ...’: Decision-making and policy 
change in the global financial crisis. LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper No. 4. We return to this typology 
later in our discussion. 
32 Scarry, E. (2011). Thinking in an Emergency. New York and London: W. W. Norton. 
33 Anderson, B. (2017). Emergency futures: Exception, urgency, interval, hope. The Sociological Review, 65(3), 
463-477. 
34 Cyders, M. A., & Smith, G. T. (2008). Emotion-based dispositions to rash action: Positive and negative urgency. 
Psychological Bulletin, 134(6), 807-828. doi:10.1037/a0013341 
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We briefly note here a fourth term: the Anthropocene, a newly-named geological epoch. Like 
the three terms we consider above, the Anthropocene emphasizes the disruptive nature of climate 
change, but considers its temporality in a different way. It provides a much broader temporal 
scale, directing attention backward across decades and centuries to long-established, deeply 
rooted causes; its forward gaze considers the possibility of a distant future in which we have 
been forced to address these tensions, though the motivation for and nature of this resolution 
often remain unspecified.35 In this way, discussions of the Anthropocene stand in contrast to the 
focus on immediate action that characterize the other three terms, on which our discussion is 
centered.  For some who draw on the concept of the Anthropocene, the notion of a deliberative 
escape from the destruction of climate change seems naive at best.36 Though we share this sense 
that the challenge of climate change reflects profound structural contradictions, we remain 
hopeful for the possibility of meaningful, willful response in the present and near future. 
 
The title of this article, which refers to urgency, is chosen carefully, as many of the 
psychological dimensions of the time pressure of climate action discussed below reflect 
“urgency” as an internalized crisis or emergency. Throughout our discussion below, then, we 
seek to draw a link between two things: (1) the social construction of “climate crisis” or “climate 
emergency” (which we document through an analysis of the ways in which climate change is 
framed in speech) and (2) the psychological effects of urgency. 
 
 
3. The social elements of time pressure 
 
Climate change is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon. As a result, climate decision 
making demands sensemaking across scales, times, and places, a process that can be particularly 
difficult for non-expert actors. In such contexts, decision makers often make use of various 
heuristics, either consciously or unconsciously. Prior experience is one such heuristic: memories 
help individuals to form expectations that are helpful in guiding action; at the same time, 
memories can in turn shape individuals’ general impression of objects and events. Individuals 
may also make use of a frame—“words and nonverbal interactions that help individuals 
negotiate meaning through the lens of existing cultural beliefs and worldviews”37—for example, 
to distinguish the physical violence of play from the physical violence of aggression. 
 
Generally, framing involves an elevated salience of some aspect of a situation. Communicators, 
by eliciting a particular frame, can “promote a particular problem definition, causal 
                                               
35 Lewis, S. L., & Maslin, M. A. (2015). Defining the anthropocene. Nature, 519(7542), 171-180. 
36 Oreskes, N. & Conway, E. (2014). The collapse of Western civilization: a view from the future. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
37 Nisbet MC. (2009). Communicating climate change: Why frames matter for public engagement. Environ. Sci. 
Policy Sustain. Dev. 51(2):12–23 
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interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.” The 
complexity and structural uncertainties of climate change mean that its contours are, in a sense, 
open to debate; in such situations, framing is a key element of messaging. In the section that 
follows, we provide a number of perspectives on the process by which actors across a diverse set 
of speech domains attempt to make salient and characterize the temporality of climate change 
through the use of “crisis” or “emergency” framing. 
 
First, we follow recent scholarship in understanding the ontology of “crisis” and “emergency.” 
That is, while we acknowledge that time pressure events share “real” material qualities, we hold 
that many of the most important qualities of crisis are subjectively, socially, and discursively 
constructed38 39 40 (as opposed to being objective, a priori, and material41). Numerous authors 
have demonstrated how the construction of knowledge—especially knowledge about the 
experience of time—is formed within and interacts with cultural and political contexts.42 43 44 
“Crises are social, political, and cultural phenomena: a crisis is a crisis due to the fact that 
different groups, interested parties, and institutions perceive and experience it as a crisis,” write 
Falkheimer and Heide.45 Berkelaar and Dutta elaborate: “What is and what is not a crisis is 
situated within the local context and within the meaning structures invoked in these contexts. 
From a social constructionist perspective, since social reality is communally constructed through 
language, crises are symbolic and subjective, not simply objective events  … which is to say that 
what might be considered a crisis in one situation may not be considered a crisis in another.”46 
 
Indeed, the construction of crisis is one way through which those with social power can deploy 
rhetoric to generate action or support for proposed policies.47 Importantly, however, the 
definitions, frames, actions, and ‘imagined recoveries’ on which this rhetoric rests are 
                                               
38 Berger, P. & T. Luckmann (1967). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. 
Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. 
39 Orr, J. (1978). How shall we say: ‘Reality is socially constructed through communication?’ Central States Speech 
Journal 29: 263–274. 
40 Searle, J. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press. 
41 Habermas, Jürgen. Legitimation crisis. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975. Print. 
42 Sorokin, P., and R. Merton. 1937. “Social Time: A Methodological and Functional Analysis.” American Journal 
of Sociology 42 (5): 615–629. 
43 Foucault, M. & Sheridan, A. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books. 
44 Landes, D. (1983). Revolution in time : clocks and the making of the modern world. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press. 
45 Falkheimer, J. & M. Heide (2010). Crisis communicators in change: From plans to improvisations. In W. T. 
Coombs & S. J. Holladay (eds.), The Handbook of Crisis Communication. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 511–
526. 
46 Berkelaar, B.L. and Dutta, M.J. (2007). A Culture-centered Approach to Crisis Communication. Paper Presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the NCA 93rd Annual Convention; Chicago, IL. 
47 Echoing suggestions, for instance, by Bordieu that what is at stake in all media discourse is “the imposition of the 
legitimate vision of the social world.” See: Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and symbolic power. Harvard University 
Press. 
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themselves too open to contestation and interpretation.48 Berkelaar and Dutta continue: 
“Acknowledging the culturally situated nature of crisis opens us to the possibilities that crises are 
located within complexly constituted and continuously contested cultural spaces.” Emphasizing 
the exercise of power in the social construction of crisis—and especially the role of the media as 
a conduit for this power—we adopt a view of the “making urgent” of climate change that 
emphasizes the importance of narrative, following influential work by Colin Hay.49 50 51 52 53 It is 
illuminating54 to situate Hay’s framework within Erik Jones’s55 two-by-two typology of decision 
making under time pressure, reproduced in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Response modes and stimulus qualities of crisis decision making 
  Response mode 
  Mechanical Rational 
Nature of 
stimulus 
Material Cybernetic Empirical 
Ideational Ideological Narrative 
 
 
In our understanding, the construal of climate change as a “crisis” or “emergency” involves two 
processes: first, the translation of artifacts of climate science into the ideational entity “climate 
change,” and second, the “crisification” of this ideational entity to promote action. The first 
                                               
48 De Rycker, Antoon, and Zuraidah Mohd Don. 2013. “Discourse in Crisis, Crisis in Discourse.” In Discourse and 
Crisis: Critical Perspectives, ed. by Antoon De Rycker, and Zuraidah Mohd Don, 3–65. 
49 Hay, C. (1994). Environmental security and state legitimacy. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 5(1), 83-97. 
50 Hay, C. (1995). Rethinking crisis: Narratives of the New Right and constructions of crisis. Rethinking Marxism, 
8(2), 60-76. 
51 Hay, C. (1996). Narrating crisis: the discursive construction of the winter of discontent'. Sociology, 30(2), 253-
277. 
52 Hay, C. (1999). Crisis and the structural transformation of the state: interrogating the process of change. The 
British journal of politics & international relations, 1(3), 317-344. 
53 Hay, C. (2016). Good in a crisis: the ontological institutionalism of social constructivism. New Political Economy, 
21(6), 520-535. 
54 De Rycker and Mohd Don, 2013. 
55 Jones, E. (2006). ‘They have no idea ...’: Decision-making and policy change in the global financial crisis. LSE 
‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper No. 4. 
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process is well documented.56 57 58 59 60 In sum, the uncertainty and complexity of global climate 
models—as well as concerted efforts to cast doubt on climate science61 62 63 64—render the 
perceived materiality of climate change incomplete.65 Instead, we argue that climate change is 
constructed as an ideational stimulus through the relay of information across circuits of meaning 
that link two groups—what Eric Paglia terms  “contributory experts” (climate scientists and 
actors in international climate policy institutions) and “interactional experts”66 (journalists and 
activists)—in an extended epistemic community. 
 
The construction of ideational “climate change,” however, is insufficient to motivate what 
contributory experts judge to be optimal action67 because, among other things, various features 
of human psychology lead to a systematic disregard of climate risks. In this vein, some authors 
highlight that climate change presents a psychologically distant threat—spatially, temporally, 
                                               
56 Hannigan, J. (2014). Environmental sociology. Routledge. 
57 Dessai, S., Adger, W. N., Hulme, M., Turnpenny, J., Köhler, J., & Warren, R. (2004). Defining and experiencing 
dangerous climate change. Climatic change, 64(1-2), 11-25. 
58 Dispensa, J. M., & Brulle, R. J. (2003). Media’s social construction of environmental issues: focus on global 
warming–a comparative study. International Journal of sociology and social policy. 
59 Pettenger, M. E. (Ed.). (2016). The social construction of climate change: Power, knowledge, norms, discourses. 
Routledge. 
60 Demeritt, D. (2001). The construction of global warming and the politics of science. Annals of the association of 
American geographers, 91(2), 307-337. 
61 Brown, R. G. E., Jr. ( 1996, October 23). "Environmental science under siege: Fringe science and the 104th 
Congress, U. S. House of Representatives" (PDF). Report, Democratic Caucus of the Committee on Science. 
Washington, D. C.: U. S. House of Representatives. 
62 Conway, Erik; Oreskes, Naomi (2010). Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on 
Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. USA: Bloomsbury. 
63 Dunlap, Riley E; McCright, Aaron M. (2011). Climate Change Denial: Sources, actors, and strategies. Taylor & 
Francis. 
64 Björnberg, Karin Edvardsson; et al. (2017). "Climate and environmental science denial: A review of the scientific 
literature published in 1990-2015". Journal of Cleaner Production. 167: 229–241. 
65 Some authors note that climate science—or the environmental sciences more generally—are prototypical “post-
normal sciences”—“one where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent … we would 
be misled if we retained the image of a process where true scientific facts simply determine the correct policy 
conclusions.” See: Funtowicz, S. O., & Ravetz, J. R. (1995). Science for the post normal age. In Perspectives on 
ecological integrity (pp. 146-161). Springer, Dordrecht. 
66 Paglia, E. (2018). The Socio-scientific Construction of Global Climate Crisis,Geopolitics, 23:1, 96-123. 
67 By which we generally mean emissions mitigation and adaptation paths compatible with the “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system,” which recent UNFCCC agreements have generally interpreted as mean global warming of 
no more than 1.5–2º C. An alternate perspective is optimality as determined by integrated assessment modeling (see, 
for example, Nordhaus, W. D. (1992). An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science, 
258(5086), 1315-1319.). Other perspectives exist, too, but nearly all optimal control scenarios suggest mitigation far 
greater than currently observed levels. 
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and socially.68 69 Others emphasize the challenge of overcoming barriers to cooperation in what 
amounts to a global prisoner’s dilemma.70 Our focus throughout is on the sort of psychological 
barriers to climate action summarized by Robert Gifford:71 “Although many individuals are 
engaged in some ameliorative action, most  … are hindered by seven categories of psychological 
barriers ... limited cognition about the problem, ideological worldviews that tend to preclude pro-
environmental attitudes and behavior, comparisons with key other people, sunk costs and 
behavioral momentum, discredence toward experts and authorities, perceived risks of change, 
and positive but inadequate behavior change.” Notably, a number of these barriers relate to 
individuals’ perceptions of the time horizon that might be implicated by “optimal action”; we 
suggest that the “crisification” of climate change is frequently an intentional attempt to increase 
the urgency of climate change in order to overcome these psychological barriers and, ultimately, 
to promote action. 
 
This second process—the “making urgent” of ideational climate change—similarly relies on 
relays across circuits of meaning linking contributory and interactional experts.72 Authors 
working in the securitization tradition of the Copenhagen School have sought to problematize 
these circuits of meaning—to highlight the intent embedded in discursive practices of what 
Buzan et al. call “speaking security”73—a critical perspective that motivates this paper. The 
Copenhagen School redefines “security” as a performative speech act: “by uttering ‘security’, a 
state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a 
special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”74 This speech act has two parts: 
first, speech that frames an issue in a way that justifies the (potentially unusual) remedies 
proposed for it; second, a relevant audience that accepts this frame. As Copenhagen School 
scholars study “security,” we similarly explore “crisis” and ”emergency,” asking, as they do, 
what slippages might be elided in the translations of interactional experts. 
 
Here, we argue that the “crisification” of climate change glosses over important psychological 
distinctions between contributory experts’ claims of “increasing urgency” and the much broader 
constellation of meaning implicitly summoned by the crisis/emergency narration of interactional 
experts. In other words, the successful construal of climate “crisis” by interactional experts 
                                               
68 Leiserowitz, A. (2007). Communicating the risks of global warming: American risk perceptions, affective images, 
and interpretive communities. In S. C. Moser, & L. Dilling (Eds.), Creating a climate for change: Communicating 
climate change and facilitating social change (pp. 44–63). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
69 McDonald, R. I., Chai, H. Y., & Newell, B. R. (2015). Personal experience and the ‘psychological distance’ of 
climate change: An integrative review. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 44, 109-118. 
70 Barrett, S. (1999). International Cooperation and the Global Environment. Global public goods, 192. 
71 Gifford, R. (2011). The dragons of inaction: psychological barriers that limit climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. American psychologist, 66(4), 290. 
72 Paglia, 2018. 
73 Buzan, B., Wæver, O., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A new framework for analysis. Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 
74 Wæver, O. (1995). “Securitization and Desecuritization.” In: Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (Ed.): On Security. Columbia 
University Press. pp. 46–86. 
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enhances listeners’ feelings of “urgency” (or time pressure), but so too may elicit related (and 
potentially undesirable) psychological responses such as fear, grief, and a greater discounting of 
future costs and benefits. In the context of the categories presented by Table 1, we might 
consider these psychological mechanisms as mediating a preference for mechanical or rational 
response—or, by extension, activating modes of meaning-making and decision characterized by 
either ideology or narrative, respectively. After below providing evidence for the processes and 
channels through which climate is framed as a “crisis,” we review the potential psychological 
implications of the various mental states elicited by the crisis frame, albeit with a central core 




4. Trends in climate discourse 
 
As awareness of the challenge of climate change has grown, so too has its discussion across 
many domains of communication. For example, the percent of all annual popular press articles75 
that mention a climate change term76 has grown from 0.14 percent in 1999 to 1.62 percent in 
2019 (Figure 1). Over the same time period, the use of the same terms in the academic press77 
grew from 0.26 to 1.05 percent of all published articles in the same respective years (Figure 1). 
Still, however, these secular trends belie simultaneously large discursive shifts in the language 
used to discuss climate change. As has been noted elsewhere, for example, the term “climate 
change” has largely displaced the term “global warming”: every year until 2003, the term “global 
warming” dominated “climate change” in the popular press, but “climate change” now 
outnumbers mentions of “global warming” in the media almost six-to-one. (Figure 2) 
 
                                               
75 Specifically, those indexed by Dow Jones Factiva 
76 Here defined as either “global warming,” “climate change,” “climate crisis,” or “climate emergency.” 




The rightmost portion of Figure 2 provides suggestive evidence for another significant shift 
currently underway: a proliferation of explicitly political, evaluative, or normative terms like 
“climate crisis” or “climate emergency” or the attachment of evaluative descriptors—in 
particular, “urgent” or “urgency”—to climate change language. Below, we present the results of 
a bibliometric analysis of the contours of this shift, analyzing the relative prevalence of different 
forms of time pressure language across four domains (the academic press, the popular press, 
documents of the international climate policy regime, and social movements) from the 1970s—
when climate change was first discussed in these domains—to the present. We find that the 
overall shift toward time pressure framing is observed to be accelerating across all domains of 
our analysis, though different speech domains appear to prefer different terms, with the potential 
implication that “urgency” has come to function as a bridging concept78 through which analytical 
                                               
78 Star, S. L., & Griesemer, J. R. (1989). Institutional ecology,translations' and boundary objects: Amateurs and 
professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39. Social Studies of Science, 19(3), 387-420. 
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claims of time pressure by academics and policymakers are translated into a crisis or emergency 
frame by the popular press and political activists. 
 
We note the suddenness of this shift: while “climate crisis” and “climate emergency” appeared in 
less than one percent of all periodical articles discussing climate change every year prior to 2019, 
the terms appeared in more than eight and six percent, respectively, of these articles this year 
(Figure 5). Indeed, “climate emergency” is Oxford Dictionaries 2019 “word of the year”79—




Articles appearing in academic journals, which are typically less likely to contain evaluative 
language, demonstrate a similar, albeit earlier, change: every year before 2007, time pressure 
                                               
79 A term that it subsequently defined as “a situation in which urgent action is required to reduce or halt climate 
change and avoid potentially irreversible environmental damage resulting from it.” 
80 The Collins Dictionaries’ “word of the year.” 
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terms are found together with discussions of climate change in less than 0.0005 percent of all 
academic articles, whereas in 2018, 0.014 percent of  academic articles contained such co-
occurrences—a 30-fold increase. Roughly half of this growth occurred in each of two periods, 
the first from 2006 to 2008 and the second from 2017 to 2019. While it is difficult to discern the 
precise reasons for the sudden proliferation of these discursive formations, there are obvious 
candidate catalysts. 
 
In the period 2006–2008: Al Gore released his movie An Inconvenient Truth on 24 May 2006 
and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize jointly with the IPCC on 12 October 2007. The term 
“climate crisis” appeared both in Gore’s acceptance speech (10 December 2007) and in the film, 
which was released on video on 21 November 2006. The importance of this film to the popular 
imagination is suggested by Google Search trends for related terms (Figure 4). Later in this 
period, it was widely recognized that the world had failed to negotiate a comprehensive 
greenhouse gas emissions mitigation treaty at the 15th Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC, 
held in Copenhagen in December 2009, despite a prevailing sense that these negotiations would 
succeed (Figure 3). 
 
In the period 2017–2019: Numerous social movements began to prominently use terms such as 
“climate emergency”; some, such as The Climate Mobilization, Extinction Rebellion, and 
Fridays for Future, have made the promotion of this discursive shift a key part of their 
organizational goals.81 82 Partly in response to these social movements, over 1300 local 
governments, 25 national governments, and the European Parliament have formally declared a 
“climate emergency” since January 2018.83 Widespread strikes and protests (the “Global Climate 
Strike”) then took place 20–27 September 2019, a week which included the highly anticipated 
United Nations Climate Summit; organizers estimate up to 8 million people across 150 countries 
participated in this action. Google Search trend results for “climate crisis” and “climate 
emergency” illustrate the importance of these strikes for the salience of these terms (Figure 3). 
 
                                               
81 Consider The Climate Mobilization’s advocacy for local government declarations of “climate emergency”: “The 
goal of the Climate Emergency Campaign is to compel governments, starting at the local level and building upward, 
to adopt an emergency response to climate change and the broader ecological crisis. Entering emergency mode is the 
critical first step to launching the comprehensive mobilization required to rescue and rebuild civilization.” 
82 Note that some political movements began calling for such a linguistic shift much earlier—such as the Climate 
Crisis Coalition, founded in 2004, which stated as its goal “to create awareness and a sense of urgency about climate 
disruption and to broaden the constituency of the climate action movement.” 
83 Legislation for such a declaration at the national level in the United States was introduced to Congress on 9 July 




As a whole, articles from the academic press are more likely to use “urgency” language than 
“crisis” or “emergency” to describe climate change (Figure 4). There are a number of potential 
reasons for this apparent preference: first, “urgency” is at least facially more neutral and less 
alarmist84—perhaps a reflection of “scientific reticence”85 or “erring on the side of least 
drama”;86 second, “urgency” maps more cleanly onto existing language (“climate change” and 
“global warming”) that is deeply embedded in a publishing ecosystem heavily reliant on the 
persistence of keywords and journal titles. 
 
                                               
84 The academic community as a whole, however, uses the terms “crisis” and “emergency” more often than 
“urgency” or “urgent,” which suggests that the reluctance to use these facially more political terms is not 
generalized (See Appendix A). 
85 Hansen, J. E. (2007). Scientific reticence and sea level rise. Environmental research letters, 2(2), 024002. 
86 Brysse, K., Oreskes, N., O’Reilly, J., & Oppenheimer, M. (2013). Climate change prediction: Erring on the side 




The overall prevalence of time pressure terms in popular press discussions of climate change 
appears to largely mirror that seen in the academic literature (Figure 5; note differing axes), with 
the exception of 2019, a year during which the terms “climate crisis” and “climate emergency” 
grew markedly in use (Figure 5). Much of this growth in the prevalence of these terms in the 
popular press was driven by a number of major media outlets, notably The Guardian87 and 
Telemundo,88 that changed their style guides to mandate the use of either “climate crisis” or 
“climate emergency” in place of “climate change” or “global warming”—a move which 
followed earlier suggestions by activists and politicians to that effect.89 
                                               
87Carrington, D. (2019, May 17). “Why the Guardian is changing the language it uses about the environment.” The 
Guardian. 
88 Planeta Tierra: Alzar la voz contra la Emergencia Climática | Noticias Telemundo. (2019, June 5). Noticias 
Telemundo. 
89 An often cited example is Greta Thunberg’s 4 May 2019 tweet: “It’s 2019. Can we all now please stop saying 
“climate change” and instead call it what it is: climate breakdown, climate crisis, climate emergency, ecological 
breakdown, ecological crisis and ecological emergency? #ClimateBreakdown #EcologicalBreakdown.” 
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Shortly after The Guardian’s style guide modifications, two prominent announcements were 
made related to climate journalism. First, Public Citizen—in collaboration with the Sierra Club, 
Food & Water Watch, Greenpeace USA, 350.org, and a number of other prominent advocacy 
organizations—relayed an open letter90 to the presidents and CEOs of ABC, CBS, Fox, NBC, 
MSNBC, and CNN that called on them to make similar changes to their networks’ coverage of 
climate change. Second, the Columbia Journalism Review and The Nation published an open 
letter calling for better journalistic coverage of climate change (“Instead of sleepwalking us 
toward disaster,” it reads, “the US news media need to remember their Paul Revere 
responsibilities—to awaken, inform, and rouse the people to action”91) and established a joint 
project, Covering Climate Now, that asked networks to commit to making “a good faith effort to 
run as much high-quality climate coverage” as possible for the week before the United Nations’ 
Climate Action Summit in New York on 23 September 2019. Around 200 outlets—including 
Bloomberg, CBS News, El País, the Asahi Shimbun, The Times of India, Nature, Science, the 
Harvard Business Review, Vanity Fair, HuffPost, BuzzFeed News, and The Daily Beast—agreed 
to participate. 
 
While a small number outlets made changes as explicit as that made by The Guardian,92 many 
increased their coverage of climate change (Figure 1); the frequency with which coverage of 
climate change included time pressure terms, however, grew much faster than coverage of 
climate change as a whole (Figure 5 reports frequency relative to the underlying volume of 
climate change coverage).93 Notably, though, the use of “urgency” language has experienced far 
slower recent growth in the popular press than the use of “crisis” or “emergency” language. 
 
                                               
<https://twitter.com/GretaThunberg/status/1124723891123961856>. Earlier, the United States House of 
Representatives had in January 2019 established a “Select Committee on the Climate Crisis” and the Secretary 
General of the United Nations, António Guterres, had talked of the “climate crisis” in a widely covered September 
2018 speech.  
90 Weissman, R., Brune, M., Hauter, W., Leonard, A., McKibben, B., Miller, R. L., Minsky, A., Berlin, K., Pica, E., 
Prakash, V., Romero, M., Suckling, K., & Yearwood, Rev. (2019, June 6). Letter to Major Networks: Call it a 
Climate Crisis - and Cover it Like One. Public Citizen. 
91 Hertsgaard, M. and Pope, K. (2019, April) “The media are complacent while the world burns.” Columbia 
Journalism Review. 
92 The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, for instance, updated its style guide to say the following: “Climate crisis 
and climate emergency are OK in some cases as synonyms for "climate change." But they're not always the best 
choice... For example, "climate crisis" could carry a whiff of advocacy in certain political coverage.” 




In comparison, we find that academic and popular press articles differ in the time pressure terms 
they use to describe climate change despite discussing climate change at similar overall rates. 
One potential implication of this observation is that “urgency”—as distinct from “crisis” or 
“emergency”—has come to function as a bridging concept that relays the notion of time pressure 
between the research community and the media. Indeed, justifications for the use of “crisis” or 
“emergency” frames—for example, pieces explaining The Guardian’s style changes,94 bolstering 
The Climate Mobilization’s advocacy for climate emergency declarations,95 or justifying 
                                               
94 Zeldin-O’Neill, S. (2019, October 16). “It’s a crisis, not a change”: The six Guardian language changes on climate 
matters. The Guardian. 




Extinction Rebellion’s “climate crisis” frame96—often cite recent international documents97 that 
use almost exclusively “urgent” to describe the time pressure associated with climate change 
(Appendix B). In other words, these institutions equate researchers’ statements of “urgency” with 
“crisis” or “emergency” despite their different semantic content. 
 
This observed difference might be explained, at least in part, by domain norms. Boykoff and 
Rajan, for instance, write that “some of the challenges of reporting on climate change are 
inherent to the differences in language—in both lexicon and usage—between science and the 
public. Scientists tend to speak in cautious language when describing their research, and to 
discuss the implications of their research in terms of probabilities. For journalists and policy‐
makers, this is difficult to translate into the crisp, unequivocal commentary that is often valued in 
communications and decision‐making.”98 The translation of climate change research for public 
consumption is notoriously difficult given its reliance on time-varying probability distributions 
that result from the projection of historical data into previously unobserved states of the earth 
system. 
 
The result of this translation is interactional experts’ articulation of a “crisis”/“emergency” 
frame. The success of this articulation (and its attendant political and psychological salience) 
relies, though, on constructing an equivalence with contributory experts’ claims of urgency—
something we find are of relatively recent origin (Figure 4; Appendix B). Unsuccessful 
                                               
96 Extinction Rebellion. (n.d.). The Emergency. Extinction Rebellion. Retrieved May 1, 2020, from 
https://rebellion.earth/the-truth/the-emergency/ 
97 These explanations tend especially to cite the 2018 IPCC special report “Global Warming of 1.5 ºC,” the 
UNFCCC’s 2015 Paris Agreement, the language of Sustainable Development Goal 13, and the 2019 Global 
Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. Of interest, the summary statement of SDG 13 (“Take urgent action to combat 
climate change and its impacts”) is perhaps the most prominent—and a relatively early—description of climate 
change as an “urgent” issue. The “urgency” language in this goal was to have been settled in July 2014 after it was 
introduced as an alternative to the more neutral “combat climate change” and “tackle climate change” by 
representatives of the Alliance of Small Island States (ASIS) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) at the 
Thirteenth Session of the Open Working Group of the UN General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals 
(https://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb3213e.pdf); the motivation behind this linguistic change was clarified at an 
OWG13 side event (“A Global Call Spanning the Polar Regions to the Tropics: Sustainable Development Goals 
Must Prioritize Climate Change,” organized by the United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service and co-
hosted by the Permanent Missions of Peru and the Solomon Islands to the UN, Greenpeace, 350.org, the 
International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of Tropical Forests, Climate Action Network International, 
Beyond 2015, Global Call for Climate Action, and the Natural Resources Defense Council) and is evident in the text 
of the Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities of Action Pathway negotiated by ASIS and SIDS and 
adopted later the same year, providing support for the final language approved for SDG 13 in September 2015—
which itself influenced the final text of the Paris Agreement. 
98 Boykoff, M. T., & Rajan, S. R. (2007). Signals and noise. EMBO Reports, 8(3), 207–211. 
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articulation of a crisis frame may lead to permanent damage to the authority of the frame 
narrator99 and eventual “policy boomerangs.”100 101 
 
Further, this articulation, even if successful, does not necessarily ensure greater, more optimal, or 
faster action. As noted elsewhere, crises may be “focusing events,” presenting policy windows 
by changing the relative positions of items in a policy agenda102 103 or creating an opening for 
policy entrepreneurs104 105 with “solutions in search of a problem.”106 At the same time, however, 
crises may generate counterproductive responses, including the development of a fatalistic 
outlook—leading to an abandonment of mitigation as a viable strategy107—or wholesale 
skepticism of experts.108 109 
 
Framing environmental issues—and especially climate change— as crises may be particularly 
challenging110 111 for two reasons: first, these problems often lack clearly constructable 
“enemies”112—indeed, evidence for them is often invisible outside of technical, statistical 
residues;113 second, potential solutions to these problems are themselves uncertain, leading to a 
sense of threat in the absence of agency through which to address it—“insecuritizing” message 
recipients.114 Ultimately, the responses generated by the crisis framing of climate change, then, 
                                               
99 Boas, I. (2015). Climate Migration and Security: Securitization as a Strategy in Climate Change Politics. New 
York: Routledge. 
100 Paletz, D. L., Koon, J., Whitehead, E., & Hagens, R. B. (1972). Selective exposure: The potential boomerang 
effect. Journal of Communication, 22(1), 48-53. 
101 Swatuk, L. A., Wirkus, L., Krampe, F., Thomas, B. K., & da Silva, L. P. B. (2018). The boomerang effect: 
Overview and implications for climate governance. In Water, Climate Change and the Boomerang Effect. 
Routledge. 
102 Birkland T. (2009). Media framing and policy change after Columbine. American Behavioral Scientist 52: 1405–
1425. 
103 Lowry W. (2006). Potential focusing events and policy change. Policy Studies Journal 34: 313–335. 
104 Carter, N. and Childs, M. (2017). Friends of the Earth as a policy entrepreneur: The ’Big Ask’ campaign for a 
UK Climate Change Act. Environmental Politics 27: 994–1013. 
105 Warner, J.F., Lulofs, K., and Bressers, H. (2010). The fine art of boundary spanning: making space for water in 
the East Netherlands. Water Alternatives 3(1): 137–153. 
106 Kingdon, J. (1990). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. New York: Harper Collins. 
107 Methmann, C. and Rothe, D. (2012). Politics for the day after tomorrow: The political effect of apocalyptic 
imageries in global climate governance. Security Dialogue 43(4): 323–344. 
108 Lowe, T., Brown, K., Dessai, S., et al. (2006). Does tomorrow ever come? Disaster narrative and public 
perceptions of climate change. Public Understanding of Science 15: 435–457. 
109 O’Neil, S., and Nicholson-Cole, S. (2009). ‘Fear won’t do it’. Promoting positive engagement with climate 
change through visual and iconic representations. Science Communications 30(3): 355–379. 
110 Buzan, B., Waever, O., and de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework. Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
111 Trombetta, M.J. (2008). Environmental security and climate change: Analysing the discourse. Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs. 21(4): 585–602. 
112 Prins, G. (1993). Threats without Enemies: Facing Environmental Security. London: Earthscan. 
113 Hamblyn, R. (2009). The whistleblower and the canary: Rhetorical reconstructions of climate change. Journal of 
Historical Geography 35: 223–236. 
114 Bigo, D. (2002). Security and immigration: Toward a critique of the governmentality of unease. Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political. 27: 63–92. 
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depend on both message content and characteristics of the listener. Below, we conclude by 




5. The psychological implications of time pressure framing for decision 
making 
 
Research on the effects of time pressure framing on decision making spans disciplinary 
boundaries, and addresses different time scales and domains of action. However, direct 
explorations of the effect of this framing on climate decisions is scarce, likely owing to the pace 
and complexity of the relationship between framing and the mitigation and adaptation choices 
collectively pursued by individuals, organizations, and governments. We begin by developing a 
conceptual model of an individual’s framing–psychology–choice process (Figure 6). This model 
depicts relays within and across conceptual categories, but broadly comprises two halves: 
 
● The internalization of time pressure framing and resulting changes to affect and 
cognition  (centered on the left side of Figure 6): Climate change frames encode various 
types of information. For instance, a particular framing of climate change may change the 
relative salience of the potential scale and scope of various impacts; another, especially 
one that frames climate change as an “emergency,”  might enhance the relative salience 
of information about impact pacing and sequencing. Evidence shows that information has 
psychological effects, though these effects are contextual (that is, they are determined in 
interaction with related information, the environment, etc.) and particular (i.e., it is 
affected by listener characteristics, including their memories, baseline emotional state, 
and social status). As information about climate change, framed in a particular way, is 
internalized, it combines into more complex derivative features, such psychological 
distance, perceived risks and rewards of different responses and impacts, and time 
pressure. This information and its derivative features elicit affective or emotional states115 
(including fear, grief, anger, hope, apathy, or guilt) and changes to cognition (including 
one’s time discount rate, approach to risk and uncertainty,  or social aggregation 
weights), which are typically modeled separately.116 
 
● The externalization of affect and cognition in choice (roughly the right side of Figure 6): 
The ways in which a frame modulates an individual’s affective or cognitive processes in 
turn affect the quantity and quality of information considered in the choice process, as 
well as the range of response options they consider (for example, geoengineering) and the 
                                               
115 Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings. Psychological Bulletin, 
127(2), 267. 
116 Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American Psychologist, 35(2), 151. 
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sequencing and timing of chosen plan elements. An individual’s mental states also affect 
choice indirectly by leading to the adoption of various decision-relevant behaviors, such 
as greater focus, information collection, cooperation, active avoidance, or the adoption of 
a commitment mechanism. The realized effects of these mental states on choice exhibit 





Though calls for more research into these processes have persisted for over a decade,117 118 our 
understanding has been hindered by the fact that researchers generally only observe the 
outcomes of the complex system represented in Figure 6. Adding to this complexity, any work in 
this field must also grapple with the multiple meanings associated with climate change; co-
occurring social, technological, and ecological changes; and mediators and moderators of the 
impacts of climate change.119 Still, available insight120 and practitioner interest continues to 
                                               
117 Kazdin, A.E. (2009). Psychological science’s contributions to a sustainable environment: Extending our research 
to a grand challenge of society. American Psychologist, 64, 339–356. 
118 Nordhaus, T., & Shellenberger, M. (2007). Break through: From the death of environmentalism to the politics of 
possibility. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin. 
119 Doherty, T. J., & Clayton, S. (2011). The psychological impacts of global climate change. American 
Psychologist, 66(4), 265. 
120 Swim, J., Clayton, S., Doherty, T., Gifford, R., Howard, G., Reser, J., et al. (2009). Psychology and global 
climate change: Addressing a multi-faceted phenomenon and set of challenges. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
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grow—much relevant to our narrower focus here: the effect of time pressure framing on climate-
relevant decisions. 
 
5.1. Affective processes 
At its most basic level, simply thinking about climate change—whether as a crisis or not—
generates a variety of emotional states. The most recent edition of “Climate Change in the 
American Mind,”121 a semi-annual survey, found that Americans report feeling either moderate 
or intense versions of the following emotions when thinking about climate change, in decreasing 
prevalence: worry (66 percent), interest, helplessness, disgust, fear, rage, anger, hope, shame, 
guilt, and courage (29 percent). Further, the percent of Americans “very worried” about climate 
change has tripled since 2010, while the percent of Americans feeling any degree of hope has 
remained unchanged. A 2017 special report from the American Psychological Association, 
“Mental Health and Our Changing Climate,” states that “psychological responses to climate 
change, such as conflict avoidance, fatalism, fear, helplessness, and resignation are growing. 
These responses are keeping us, and our nation, from properly addressing the core causes of and 
solutions for our changing climate, and from building and supporting psychological 
resiliency.”122 
 
Fear is perhaps the best understood potential emotional consequence of climate crisis framing. 
Theoretical interest in the effects of fear appeals on affect and choice date to the early 1970s.123 
Extensive laboratory studies on fear appeals have led to the development of many (at times 
conflicting) models relating fear to action, including the linear, nonlinear, parallel processing,124 
expectancy value, and protection motivation models. The lack of clarity resulting from 
laboratory studies of fear appeals suggests that fear may have a weak and directionally 
ambiguous125 effect on action in the context of larger, longer term decisions more closely 
resembling those relevant to climate change.126 Still, some findings are consistent: fear appeals 
are likely to produce maladaptive responses such as defensive avoidance, selective exposure, 
                                               
121 Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Rosenthal, S., Kotcher, J., Bergquist, P., Ballew, M., Goldberg, M., & Gustafson, 
A. (2019). Climate change in the American mind: November 2019. Yale University and George Mason University. 
New Haven, CT: Yale Program on Climate Change Communication. 
122 Clayton, S., Manning, C. M., Krygsman, K., & Speiser, M. (2017). Mental Health and Our Changing Climate: 
Impacts, Implications, and Guidance. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, and ecoAmerica. 
123 Leventhal, H. (1971). Fear appeals and persuasion: the differentiation of a motivational construct. American 
Journal of Public Health, 61(6), 1208-1224. 
124 Witte, K. (1992). Putting the fear back into fear appeals: The extended parallel process model. Communications 
Monographs, 59(4), 329-349. 
125 Lowe, T., Brown, K., Dessai, S., de Franca Doria, M., Haynes, K., & Vincent, K. (2006). Does tomorrow ever 
come? Disaster narrative and public perceptions of climate change. Public Understanding of Science, 15, 435-457. 
126 Hastings, G., Stead, M., & Webb, J. (2004). Fear appeals in social marketing: Strategic and ethical reasons for 
concern. Psychology & Marketing, 21, 961-986. 
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apathy, and reactance127 128 129 (some studies suggest fear appeals in isolation may become so 
overwhelming as to produce anger and violence130), but these maladaptive responses are 
tempered if the fear appeal is presented alongside equally salient information about self-
efficacy.131 132 In the better studied public health context of fear appeals, “perceived self-efficacy 
in responding to a threat, expected response costs, and intention have been found to be the 
strongest predictors of concurrent or future behavior.”133 Put simply, fear is shown to provoke 
one of two responses: an attempt to control the source of fear or, if this is challenging or 
impossible, an attempt to directly control this affective state.134 Important to our discussion here, 
some evidence suggests that the invocation of fear in more deliberative, longer-term decision 
making may also promote cooperation or compromise while an individual seeks to construct a 
sense of self-efficacy.135 
 
An enhanced sense of crisis can also produce feelings of grief. In parsing the constellation of 
negative valence climate emotions, it can be helpful to distinguish between retrospective and 
prospective feelings.136 Cunsolo and Ellis, for instance, document climate grief associated with 
already realized physical environmental loss and the loss of environmental knowledge—
occasionally styled as “solastalgia”137—but also an anticipatory grief over expected future losses 
of culture, livelihoods, and ways of life.138 Such grief manifests in groups as diverse as wheat 
farmers in Western Australia,139 the Inuit in Arctic Canada,140 and Sami reindeer herders in 
                                               
127 Witte, K. (1994). Fear control and danger control: A test of the extended parallel process model (EPPM). 
Communications Monographs, 61(2), 113-134. 
128 Ruiter, R. A., Abraham, C., & Kok, G. (2001). Scary warnings and rational precautions: A review of the 
psychology of fear appeals. Psychology and Health, 16(6), 613-630. 
129 Ruiter, R. A., Verplanken, B., De Cremer, D., & Kok, G. (2004). Danger and fear control in response to fear 
appeals: The role of need for cognition. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 26(1), 13-24. 
130 Gray, G. M., & Ropeik, D. P. (2002). Dealing with the dangers of fear: the role of risk communication. Health 
Affairs, 21(6), 106-116. 
131 Bandura, A. (1997). Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control. Macmillan. 
132 Ruiter, et al., 2001. 
133 Milne, S., Sheeran, P., & Orbell, S. (2000). Prediction and intervention in health‐related behavior: A meta‐
analytic review of protection motivation theory. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30(1), 106-143. 
134 Moser, S. C., & Dilling, L. (2004). Making climate hot. Environment, 34, 32-46. 
135 MacKuen, M., Wolak, J., Keele, L., & Marcus, G. E. (2010). Civic engagements: Resolute partisanship or 
reflective deliberation. American Journal of Political Science, 54(2), 440-458. 
136 Robinson, M. D., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Belief and feeling: evidence for an accessibility model of emotional 
self-report. Psychological Bulletin, 128(6), 934. 
137 Albrecht, G., Sartore, G. M., Connor, L., Higginbotham, N., Freeman, S., Kelly, B., ... & Pollard, G. (2007). 
Solastalgia: the distress caused by environmental change. Australasian Psychiatry, 15(sup1), S95-S98. 
138 Cunsolo, A., & Ellis, N. R. (2018). Ecological grief as a mental health response to climate change-related loss. 
Nature Climate Change, 8(4), 275. 
139 Ellis, N. R., & Albrecht, G. A. (2017). Climate change threats to family farmers' sense of place and mental 
wellbeing: A case study from the Western Australian Wheatbelt. Social Science & Medicine, 175, 161-168. 
140 Cunsolo Willox, A., Harper, S. L., Ford, J. D., Landman, K., Houle, K., & Edge, V. L. (2012). “From this place 
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northern Sweden.141 Feelings of anticipatory grief are likely to be “both acute and chronic, 
carried psychologically and emotionally, but … not linked to any one event or break moment, 
and [to] develop[] over time, with knowledge of what could come based both on already-
experienced changes ... and projected changes.”142 Due to their future orientation, such feelings 
may be furthermore opaque—a sort of ambiguous loss143 for which terminological resolution is 
particularly challenging. Important to action, climate grief contains but also reinforces a sense of 
low self-efficacy, a recognized feature of trauma.144 Faced with a seemingly insurmountable 
challenge, individuals become less charitable (because they perceive their individual influence as 
small) and experience less “warm glow” when at least some suffering cannot be avoided.145 
Negative moods are also associated with deeper, more deliberative, and more critical processing 
of risk information and overtly persuasive narratives.146 147 
 
Some authors, however, find that descriptions of or information about climate change fail to 
generate a sense of urgency when not explicitly framed as a matter of high time pressure because 
of the psychological distance that is created in the absence of this frame.148 Supporting this 
claim, recent evidence suggests that the time pressure framing of climate change modulates 
affect in ways that neutral description or information do not; different climate change terms have 
been empirically shown to cause differing levels of physiological arousal: laboratory 
measurements of electroencephalography and galvanic skin response indicate that “climate 
change,” for instance, produces less than one-third the somatic response of “climate crisis” in 
self-identified Republicans (the effect is significantly smaller for self-identified Democrats).149 
The effect of increased affective stress on decision making depends on characteristics of both the 
decision maker and the decision situation. In a recent review of the effect of stress on decision 
making, Starcke and Brand find that greater stress leads to more automatic action, reduced 
learning, and higher reward sensitivity, but that there are “situations in which increased risk 
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taking, heightened reward sensitivity and automatic processing may be beneficial.”150 Climate-
related stress, in particular, is also likely to lead to increases in stress-related problems, such as 
substance abuse, anxiety disorders, and depression.151 
 
Related to our earlier discussion, emotion itself is a central reason why high levels of stress 
negatively affect choice quality.152 Some research suggests that affect may be considered a kind 
of heuristic for judging the relative costs and benefits of potential actions.153 154 A closely related 
theory, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis,155 argues that risk information, such as that contained in 
time pressure messaging, produces a visceral affective response (including fear, anger, guilt, 
anxiety, or dread) that in turn has informational value to cognitive deliberation.156 While some 
studies have shown that individuals who perceive greater risks from climate change are more 
likely to have begun to address it,157 causality in this relationship—given related research on 
stress and affect—is by no means clear. 
 
Insofar as stress is related to increased time pressure, time constraints—perceived or actual—
thus affect one’s ability to make good decisions; a large body of literature has found this to be 
the case for individuals,158 groups,159 organizations,160 and political bodies.161 In investigating 
differences in individuals’ responses to time constraints, psychologists distinguish between the 
related notions of time pressure and time urgency.162 The former, time pressure, typically refers 
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to externally imposed time constraints determined on a situation-by-situation basis. Time 
urgency, by contrast, refers to internally imposed time constraints determined on an individual 
basis, often as a durable feature of behavior or personality. 
 
One consistent finding has been that some individuals—sometimes called “time urgent” 
individuals—respond positively (i.e., they tend to perform better in decision tasks) to time 
constraint-induced arousal, but are generally averse to and adversely affected by uncertainty due 
to an over-reliance on previously successful strategies in nonetheless novel situations.163 164 
Individuals with low time urgency are the opposite: they generally thrive in uncertain situations, 
but perform poorly under time pressure.165 166 This general relationship highlights the fact that 
time pressure has both material and subjective qualities; as a result, the complexity or novelty of 
a task (a stressor related to task uncertainty167) can modulate perceived time pressure even as the 
absolute time remaining for task completion is held fixed.168 For both high and low time urgency 
individuals, however, a high level of time pressure is likely to produce negative emotions and 
lower subjective well-being.169 170 
 
Across all types of individuals, time pressure exhibits a concave parabolic (“inverted U”) 
relationship with creativity and motivation171 172: at very low levels of time pressure, the 
focusing quality of time173 is absent and tasks fail to hold individuals’ attention174; at very high 
levels of time pressure, stress is distracting175 and a considerable portion of individuals’ finite 
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mental resources176 177 must be directed to monitoring the progress of the task itself.178 Moderate 
levels of time pressure, by contrast, can promote goal setting and achievement,179 ultimately 
leading to a greater sense of personal accomplishment associated with greater subjective well-
being.180 
 
The degree to which perceived time constraints affect choice also depends on characteristics of 
the listener including their worldview, prior experience, and values. It is well understood that 
one’s group membership exerts a strong influence on one’s political views181 and the way that 
new information is assimilated into one’s existing worldview.182 As a result, the subject of time 
pressure framing affects the degree to which a message’s time pressure is internalized: 
increasingly urgent climate messaging might be readily labeled as alarmism by those least likely 
to support climate mitigation (e.g., “climate skeptics”) and may be most arousing to those 
already alarmed about climate change, thereby increasing their affective stress to 
counterproductively high levels—with the relationship between stress and choice quality 
following, as above, a concave parabolic (“inverted U”) pattern.183 Evidence also suggests that 
individuals reporting a greater sense of ignorance about climate change were more likely to 
actively avoid hearing negative information about its effects184 and those most distressed by 
climate change react most negatively to climate activism.185 Finally, prior experience mediates 
both the development of individuals’ response heuristics186 and their willingness to accept 
attributional claims.187 The fundamental importance of individual traits to the integration and 
response to frames and information  
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There are a number of reasons why a climate crisis message, even if believed by the listener, 
might induce a behavioral boomerang effect.188 First, crisis messaging that underscores the 
pervasiveness of anthropogenic interference with the climate system might reinforce the 
normalcy of such interference.189 Second, in the case of messaging intended to affect 
consumption behavior, such messaging may induce trait or psychological reactance—i.e., an 
enhanced attraction to “forbidden fruits” or newly perceived scarcity.190 191 192 Third, the 
ubiquity of targeted behavioral messaging may lead to an individual’s inability to suppress 
thoughts about the proscribed behaviors.193 194 Finally, the assignment of responsibility for 
potential harms—whether to oneself or distant others—is likely to induce emotions such as guilt 
or challenges to one’s preferred view of the world as inherently fair or just. As argued by just-
world theory,195 individuals facing such emotions are likely to engage in motivated moral 
reasoning196  to allay recrimination and minimize their perceived complicity in the presented 
emergency.197 Motivated reasoning is also likely to increase overall polarization in beliefs about 
climate change.198 
 
5.2. Cognitive processes 
Assembling a sequence of actions to respond to climate change involves judgement among 
numerous response alternatives across time, type, and intensity. Emphasis on the time sensitivity 
of climate change mitigation or adaptation can potentially affect one’s choice of an optimal 
response path by modulating one’s (1) subjective discount rate, (2) approach toward risk or 
uncertainty, (3) reliance on heuristics in social aggregation, or (4) preferred types of mitigation 
or adaptation activities. 
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Numerous studies across psychology and economics explore the complex interaction between 
time pressure and the rate at which individuals discount future costs and benefits. Dual-systems 
psychological models of decision making describe choice as the outcome of an interplay between 
a system of automatic, unconscious, faster, affective judgements (occasionally, “System 1”) and 
a system of deliberative, conscious, slower, cognitive choice (“System 2”).199 200 201 In these 
models, the judgements of the affective mental system are tempered by the considerations of the 
cognitive system, however the degree to which affective judgements are reviewed by the 
cognitive system is affected by many things, including stress, time pressure, or even addiction.202 
203 In economic parameterizations of this relationship, affective judgement is modeled as 
exhibiting strong present bias,204 whereas cognitive choice exhibits a weaker but still positive 
discounting of distant costs and benefits.205 206 207 208 209 Laboratory experiments that seek to test 
these models typically vary the time available to subjects while they weigh binary alternatives. 
These studies have found that time pressure reduces interpersonal bargaining efficiency and 
leads to greater disagreement in negotiation.210 211 212 213 In games with coordinated optima, 
however, time pressure generally increases cooperation.214 215 These studies also find that time 
pressure enhances the endowment effect (a greater aversion to losses than motivation toward 
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gains of similar magnitude)216 and heuristic reasoning.217 Overall, evidence on the impact of time 
pressure on intertemporal discounting, despite clear theoretical predictions, is mixed,218 219 with 
some studies suggesting that empirically conflicting results might be the result of a tripartite 
relationship between mood, discounting, and time pressure220 and others suggesting an 
unexplored connection to underlying cognitive load.221 More work is needed to parse the 
complex terrain of affect, cognition, and urgency in settings of lagged costs and benefits. In the 
context of environmental decisions, some suggest individuals’ concerns about legacy may also 
temper the degree to which they discount the future benefits of climate action,222 though the 
relationship of this motivation with respect to time pressure is unexplored. 
 
To the extent that the time pressure framing of climate change enhances a listener’s sense of 
uncertainty about impacts or potential solutions, it may induce optimism bias.223 224 For instance, 
most audiences systematically underestimate the degree of agreement indicated by the IPCC’s 
uncertainty statements,225 indicating a large potential scope for this source of cognitive bias. 
There is some evidence that, at least over a short time horizon, increased time pressure can lead 
to an increased willingness to bear risks.226 227 228 
 
Time pressure can also affect the relative weights that an individual places on the damages or 
benefits expected to be experienced by different people in different places. At baseline, group 
membership is a strong predictor of the intensity with which an individual considers a given cost 
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or benefit when choosing between alternative actions.229 For example, individuals are more 
likely to support climate change mitigation or adaptation when it is presented in a way that 
emphasizes personal health consequences rather than consequences on more distant systems.230 
Identity also plays an important role in cooperation. While the social heuristics hypothesis holds 
that individuals under time pressure are overall more likely to cooperate,231 the effect of time 
pressure on cooperation across groups is more nuanced.232 As discussed above, time pressure 
leads to greater reliance on heuristics—in this instance, group heuristics that inform an 
individual’s perception of those with whom they must cooperate. Available heuristics may either 
harm233 or improve234 decision quality depending on the degree to which they align with or 
contradict optimal choice.235  
 
Despite advances made in understanding the connection between cognition and time pressure, 
the degree to which these patterns persist in the context of climate relevant decisions—
characterized by significant time lags, nonlinearities, uncertainty, and the need for cooperation—
is unclear. Efforts to understand the impact of time pressure on cognition in this setting must 
connect two parallel literatures: first, the literature relating cognition to time pressure; second, 
the literature exploring cognition in environmental contexts, frequently characterized by the 
involvement of multiple actors and complexity in time and space. 
 
Finally, the emergency framing of climate change can influence climate decision making through 
two social cognitive channels: first, by foreclosing democratic debate on alternatives; and 
second, by legitimating or enhancing the apparent inevitability of particular solutions. Both 
processes entail a shallowing of our ecological mind236—an obscuring of critiques of the core 
issues that have led to climate change, including the tendency of capitalist production to 
externalize costs and the modern orientation toward nature as either infinite or fully manageable. 
The emergency frame, by shrinking the apparent time remaining for a more measured response, 
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lends legitimacy to actions that may exhibit an “ironic perversity of a ‘pragmatism’ that is no 
different, in principle, from the problems [they] hope to resolve.”237 Actors might deploy 
emergency frames to “power”238 through ordinary deliberative processes; in such environments, 
“policy is fast-tracked; participation, democratic deliberation, cost–benefit assessments, 
environmental impact assessments are cast aside or bypassed.”239 240 Within the logic of 
emergency, actors may feel encouraged to prioritize large-scale technical solutions—a kind of 
techno-salvation—that promise to bring about a quick, cheap solution to the crisis state.241 242 
These observations mirror Frederickson’s broaden-and-build theory, which emphasizes that 
negative emotions often narrow an individual’s action repertoire (e.g., calling for “fight” or 
“flight”) while positive emotions broaden it, leading to non-specific interest in play, exploration, 
or ideation.243 A narrow, techno-salvationist approach toward crisis resolution is both reflected in 
and reinforced244 245 by the language we adopt to describe the era in which this crisis state was 





In this paper, we explored the mechanisms behind and implications of the increasing urgency of 
climate change. First, we discussed relevant distinctions between the separate but related notions 
of urgency, crisis, and emergency. Second, we examined the treatment of the concept of time 
pressure in several bodies of social science literature. Third, we presented the results of a 
bibliometric analysis of the time pressure framing of climate change in academic and popular 
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sources. Finally, we summarized some findings from psychology and related literature that 
suggest ways in which time pressure framing might affect climate-relevant decision making. 
 
We find that climate change has come to be framed as a phenomenon of increasing urgency over 
the past 20 years, a trend reflected in the terminology used by the popular press, social 
movements, academic articles, and the international climate policy regime (including  IPCC’s 
Fifth Assessment Report, the Paris Agreement, and Sustainable Development Goal 13). Increases 
in the use of time pressure language when discussing climate change were especially pronounced 
in two periods, the first from 2006 to 2009 and the second from 2017 to the present; however, in 
the more recent period, articles in the popular press and social movements came to frame the 
time pressure of climate change specifically as a “crisis” or “emergency.” This particular framing 
of climate change has both locutionary and illocutionary force—that is, it both describes a 
phenomenon (giving form to a growing divide between expert assessment and realized policy 
changes) and intends to change behavior (reflecting a hope that time pressure framing will 
motivate more mitigation and adaptation). In parsing these elements amidst an ambiguity of 
intention, we find the perspective of securitization helpful for its emphasis on agenda setting and 
the promotion of action. 
 
As we have shown in Section 5 of this paper, however, depictions of crises do not sit 
comfortably with a sense of empowerment. While those who perceive greater risks or are better 
informed about climate change are more likely to support policies to address it, considering risk 
and urgency in isolation ignores a wide range of negative affective responses and changes in 
cognition that accompany time pressure and may in the end undermine motivation to act. Rich 
but often disconnected literatures on time pressure, pro-environmental behavior, and cognition 
highlight the importance of habit, individuals’ finite capacity for attention, affective stress, and 
impatience to choice under time pressure. However, they offer few predictions about the effect of 
a sudden and widespread emphasis on time pressure in the context of climate-relevant decisions. 
Inference is complicated by many overlapping sources of heterogeneity in message content,247 
listener vulnerability and self-efficacy, and the complexity with which these dynamics combine 
in collective choice and cooperation.248 Further research to clarify this ambiguity is sorely 
needed. 
 
Climate change is a global phenomenon with deep, personal effects. Many individuals and 
groups—activists, scientists, indigenous peoples, journalists, and those who experience heat 
waves, wildfires, coastal floods, and the like—bear knowledge of its effects, past and future, 
with a sense of concern and the hope of resolution. As these groups come together to construct 
                                               
247 Gifford, R., & Comeau, L. A. (2011). Message framing influences perceived climate change competence, 
engagement, and behavioral intentions. Global Environmental Change, 21(4), 1301–1307. 
248 Sawitri, D. R., Hadiyanto, H., & Hadi, S. P. (2015). Pro-environmental behavior from a social cognitive theory 
perspective. Procedia Environmental Sciences, 23, 27–33. 
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an image of the challenge that humanity faces, we must be careful to tread a thin line between 
alarmism and undue optimism. If “crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the 
new cannot be born,”249 the world of climate policy is rich with possibility and so requires our 
care.  
                                               
249 Gramsci, A., & Hoare, Q. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks (p. 276). London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
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Appendix A: Prevalence of time pressure terms across the academic literature 




Appendix B: Prevalence of time pressure terms in prominent documents from 
the international climate change policy regime 
 
The linguistic trends discussed in the academic and popular presses are mirrored in the 
touchstone products of the international environmental policy regime, especially the IPCC’s 
various Assessment and Special Reports and the primary international agreements of the 
UNFCCC, as shown in the table below. 
  
Count of descriptions of 
climate change as: (direct and 





a “crisis” an “emergency” word 
count 
Prominent IPCC documents 







“Radiative Forcing of Climate 
Change and An Evaluation of 
















“The Regional Impacts of 
Climate Change: An Assessment 









“Aviation and the Global 















“Land Use, Land-Use Change, 










Technological Issues in 
























“Safeguarding the Ozone and the 















“Renewable Energy Sources and 









 “Managing the Risks of 
Extreme Events and Disasters to 



























Degradation, Sustainable Land 
Management, Food Security, and 
Greenhouse gas fluxes in 








“The Ocean and Cryosphere in a 








Primary agreements of the UNFCCC 
38 























Other documents of interest 
IPBES Global Assessment 
Report on Biodiversity and 










Appendix C: Methodological note for Figures 4 and 5 
 
In both the academic literature and popular press, “crisis” articles outnumber both “urgency” and 
“emergency” articles in naive counts, but this apparent preference in the academic literature 
disappears when the semantic context of the time pressure term is considered: about one-third of 
academic “crisis” articles discuss climate change merely as one of a list of drivers of some other 
phenomenon (most frequently an “energy,” “biodiversity,” or “financial” crisis) which is itself 
the primary topic of the article. Around one-third of the academic “emergency” articles also 
simply discuss the relevance of climate change for “emergency preparedness,” “emergency 
planning,” “emergency management,” or “emergency services.” 
 
By contrast, this is not observed in “urgency” articles: nearly all articles analyzed in this study 
use “urgency” or “urgent” to describe climate change or its direct effects. For example, of the 40 
most highly cited academic articles in which “urgency” or “urgent” appear in close proximity to 
a climate change term in either the article’s title or abstract: 
 
- 14 express a generalized sense of “urgency” given either the large predicted future or 
realized past impacts of climate change—using phrases such as “most urgent problem of 
our time” and “urgent global warming challenge” 
- 10 express a sense of urgency for further research, generally that clarifies the future 
impacts of climate change—using phrases such as “urgency of better models” and “data 
scarcity presents an urgent challenge” 
- 10 highlight the urgent need to mitigate climate change through emissions reductions or 
technological change—using phrases such as “urgent need to decarbonize” and “urgently 
install new renewable energy” 
- 6 declare an urgent demand to adapt to climate change—using phrases such as “urgent 
need to plan for flooding” and “urgent need for better fishery management practices” 
 
Once we constrain our analysis to instances where time pressure language is used to directly 
describe climate change, we find that the academic community has exhibited a strong preference 
for “urgency” over “crisis” and “emergency” each year of the past twenty. We do not find a 
significant effect for popular press articles when performing this adjustment, though the data we 
present for the popular press are in this final, adjusted form for ease of comparison. 
